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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate the macroeconomic determinants and the effect of 
host country business cycles on remittance inflows.  Estimating a dynamic panel data 
model by the system GMM, we document that remittance inflows are pro-cyclical to 
home country volatility but counter-cyclical to the volatility in host countries. This result 
does not hold for high income counties for which remittance inflows are acyclical to 
home country volatility but pro-cyclical to the volatility in host countries.  For a host 
country, remittance outflows are counter-cyclical to the volatility of home countries. 
Trade openness is the single most important factor that determines both remittance 
inflows and outflows for the home and host countries, respectively. 
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International Business Cycles and Remittance Flows 
 
“We're stuck here while our families back home in India face a dark future with no 
money. I don't have a single fils (cent)” Mohan, an Indian worker whose employer 
fled the UAE after the 2009 financial crises. (Quoted from Dawn Newspaper, 
Pakistan) 
 
1 Introduction 
Remittances account for the second largest foreign exchange inflow next to 
foreign direct investment and in some cases the largest (World Bank 2009). Remittance 
inflows to the developing countries have a number of positive impacts including 
reduction in poverty, consumption smoothing for low-income households, economic 
growth and reduction in output volatility, financial sector development, and social and 
political stability.1
Remittance
 Although these effects of remittances are well documented, the 
macroeconomic determinants of remittance inflows are largely unknown.  
2 flows are also closely related to international business cycles. For 
example, remittance inflows to low and lower-medium income countries increased 
approximately twelve-fold from US$ 19,929.98 million to US$ 235,685.7 million over 
the 1990-2008 period, but the flows declined to US$ 230,483.60 in 2009 when the 
developed economies were hit by recession. Total world remittance inflows also follow 
the same pattern increasing from US$ 68,542.45 million in 1990 to US$ 443,391.8 
million in 2008 before falling to US$ 413,678.3 in 2009.3
                                                 
1 For discussions on the effects of remittances, see Adams and Page (2003), Mundaca 
(2009), Kapur (2005), Chami et al. (2009), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009). 
 However, this pro-cyclicality 
of remittance inflows is not commonly observed in other recessions, nor is the pattern 
similar for low and high income countries (shown in Figures 1-4). There are few studies 
that examine the relation between remittance inflows and output fluctuations in 
remittance-sending countries but these studies are limited to a pair of one home 
2 Remittances are defined as the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of 
employees and migrants’ transfers (World Bank, 2009).   
3 Authors’ own calculation from the World Bank data.  
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(remittance-receiving) and one host (remittance-sending) country.4
In this paper, we employ an innovative approach to study the effects of the 
volatility of host countries vis-à-vis other macroeconomic determinants of remittance 
inflows at the cross-country level. For each home country, we construct a time series of 
the rest-of-the-world (ROW) volatility and include it as an explanatory variable in the 
regression. This ROW volatility is the weighted average of real GDP growth volatility of 
all host countries from where a home country receives remittances. The weight attached 
to a host country is its share in total remittance inflows to the home country. We also 
estimate the determinants of the remittance outflows to understand other macroeconomic 
factors of host countries that are responsible for remittance inflows to home countries. 
For the remittance sending countries, the rest-of –the-world (ROW) volatility is defined 
as the weighted average of real GDP growth volatility of all countries to which host 
countries send remittances. The weight attached to a home country is its share in total 
remittance outflows from the host country. Finally, we estimate the determinants of net 
remittance flows.  
 Shorter time series do 
not allow one to incorporate the business cycle information of all host countries (the 
number of observations for a home country is smaller than number of host countries). 
This becomes more problematic for studies at the cross-country level.  
  Using data for the 1970-2007 period for 116 countries, we estimate a dynamic 
panel data model by the system GMM method developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) for datasets with many panels and few periods. The 
dependent variable(s) is (are) the ratio of remittance inflows (outflows and net flows) to 
GDP. The explanatory variables are the relevant macroeconomic factors considered to 
determine remittance flows including home and ROW volatility. The volatility of a series 
has been calculated as the non-overlapping five-year standard deviation; hence, other data 
are compressed by taking five-year averages.  
                                                 
4 For example, Akkoyunlu and Kholodilin (2008), Sayan (2004) and Sayan and Tekin-
Koru (2008) have studied the case of Turkey and Germany, and Vargas-Silva (2008) and 
Sayan and Tekin-Koru (2008) have studied the case of Mexico and the USA. 
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The results show that remittance inflows are pro-cyclical to home country 
volatility but counter-cyclical to the volatility in host countries. This result also holds for 
low and lower-medium income countries. However, for high income counties, remittance 
inflows are acyclical to home country volatility and pro-cyclical to the volatility in host 
countries.  Trade and capital account openness increase remittance inflows for both sets 
of countries. For a host country, remittance outflows are counter-cyclical to the volatility 
of home countries. Trade openness increases remittance outflows, so do better institutions 
in high income host countries. We also find that a larger investment share and lower 
interest rate (higher money supply) decrease net remittance flows in high income 
countries, and trade openness increases net remittance flows in both low and high income 
countries. Lastly, both net remittance flows and outflows are acyclical to host country 
volatility.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
and develops the motivations of the paper. The estimation method is discussed in Section 
3 and empirical results reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Related literature and motivation of the study 
 
2.1 Literature review 
Much of the theoretical work on remittances has been devoted to the primary 
motive of migrants to remit. Among the motives put forward, altruism, insurance and 
investment are widely documented in the literature (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Cox et al., 
1998).  
If remittances are sent with an altruistic motive, they are likely to be counter-
cyclical with the output in the home country. The volume of remittance inflows will 
increase during an economic downturn in the home country, compensating families for 
the fall in income (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002). On the other hand, if remittances are 
sent with a profit driven motive, such as investment or inheritance, they are likely to be 
pro-cyclical. Under this motive, the volume of remittance inflows will decline during an 
economic downturn in the home country (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). However, an 
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increase in the migrants’ income in the host country will lead to an increase in 
remittances under both motives.5
There are several empirical studies at the macroeconomic level that investigate 
the relationship between remittance inflows and output fluctuations in the home country. 
For example, in a study of over 100 countries covering the 1975-2002 period, Giuliano 
and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) document evidence that remittances are pro-cyclical in countries 
with less developed financial systems, providing evidence in favor of the investment 
motive. Chami et al. (2009), using data spanning the 1970-2004 period for a sample of 70 
developed and developing countries, observe that remittance inflows help stabilize output 
fluctuations in the home country. In a panel study of 20 small island economies for the 
1986-2005 period, Jackman et al. (2009) show that remittances have a stabilizing effect 
on output and consumption volatility in home countries. The emphasis of these studies 
has been on the causal effect of remittance inflows on output volatility. 
 
A number of time-series studies investigate the remittance response to the output 
of both host and home countries but these are limited to remittance flows between a pair 
of countries. For example, Sayan (2004) employs quarterly time series data for 1987-
2001, and documents cross correlations between the cyclical components of real GDP 
and remittances from Germany to Turkey. He finds that remittance receipts to Turkey are 
pro-cyclical with Turkish output, but acyclical with German output. Akkoyunlu and 
Kholodilin (2008), on the other hand, find that during 1962-2004 the volume of 
remittances sent by Turkish workers in Germany varied positively with changes in 
German output rather than Turkish output. Sayan and Tekin-Koru (2008) support Sayan 
(2004) that remittance receipts to Turkey from Germany are pro-cyclical. These authors 
also document that remittance inflows to Mexico from the USA are counter-cyclical. 
Their results are also supported by Durdu and Sayan (2008) who calibrate a small open 
economy model to the data for Mexico and Turkey for the 1987-2004 period and find that 
remittance inflows dampen business cycles in Mexico, but amplify in Turkey. Vargas-
                                                 
5 Another motive closely tied to these motives and is based on the migration networks 
literature is the options motive (for a detailed discussion, see Roberts and Morris 2003).  
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Silva (2008) also documents that remittances vary counter-cyclically with Mexico’s 
output.  
 
2.2 Motivation 
The above review suggests that research on macroeconomic determinants of 
remittance inflows is scant. Furthermore, volatility in host countries is important for 
understanding remittance inflows to the home country. In other words, international 
business cycles have an effect on remittance flows. But this important link has not been 
studied at the cross-country level.  
To demonstrate the relation between international business cycles and remittance 
inflows, we plot the average remittance inflows over the 1970-2009 period and look 
particularly at the periods of recessions in the USA defined by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research.  Average world remittance inflows are calculated as the total 
amount of annual remittance inflows in the world divided by the number of home 
countries. The reason for looking at average rather than total inflows is that the number of 
home countries in the data differs across years. We normalize the series at 1970. Vertical 
lines for the year 1974, 1982, 1991, 2001 and 2008 are drawn to mark the recession years 
in the USA.  
Average remittance flows for the world are displayed in Figure 1. There is a trend 
of modest increase in average remittance inflows over the sample period with a sharp 
increase since 2001 followed by a dip in 2009. During other recessions, average 
remittance inflows either remained the same (1974 and 1982 recessions) or increased 
slightly than in previous periods. Average remittance inflows declined during the first 
Gulf war. This pattern suggests that remittance inflows are in general counter-cyclical to 
the US business cycle. We also observe a similar pattern for low and lower-medium 
income countries in Figure 2. However, the pattern reverses for high-income countries in 
Figure 3. The figure clearly shows that remittance inflows sharply declined during all 
recessions suggesting a strong pro-cyclical behavior. We observe the same pattern when 
upper-medium income countries are combined with high income countries (Figure 4).  
 
Insert Figures 1-4 here 
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The figures and discussions above suggest that host country information is also 
crucial for understanding remittance inflows to home countries. However, the short time 
series do not permit incorporating the information of all host countries (number of 
observations for a home country is smaller than number of host countries). The problem 
is more acute for studies at the cross-country level. 
We therefore take an alternative approach in our cross-country study to account 
for host country information. For each home country, we construct a rest-of-the-world 
(ROW) volatility series based on the information of growth volatility in all host countries 
and include it as an explanatory variable in the regression. Moreover, we estimate an 
additional equation for the determinants of remittance outflows to understand the 
macroeconomic factors of host countries responsible for remittance inflows to home 
countries. For the latter specification, we construct another ROW volatility series for each 
host country based on the information of growth volatility in all home countries.  
The two ROW volatility series are constructed as follows. We first calculate, for 
each sample country, five-year non-overlapping standard deviations of the growth rate of 
per capita real GDP de-trended by the Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter. For a home country i, 
the ROW volatility in period (interval) t is the weighted average of the volatility of all 
host countries, defined as:  
, ,(ROW volatility)  = ,  i t j t ij
j
s i jσ ∀ ≠∑ ,   ---(1) 
where ,j tσ  is the growth volatility in host country j in period t calculated by the method 
mentioned above. The weight is calculated as /ij ij ij
j
s R R= ∑ , where ijR is the remittance 
inflows to country i from country j. 0iks =  if no remittance comes from country k.  
At the cross-country level, remittance inflow and outflow data are reported at the 
aggregate level without the sources and destinations. For a home country, the sources of 
annual inflows are not available. Similarly, for a host country, the destinations of annual 
outflows are not available. However, this detailed inflow-outflow information is available 
only for 2006 (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). The ijs  matrix is therefore calculated for 2006, 
which is then used to construct the ROW volatility in all periods. This is a limitation of 
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our ROW volatility series because the ijs matrix is time invariant, which may not be 
strictly correct. Paucity of data does not allow testing the time series properties of the 
matrix at the cross-country level. However, there is evidence that for some countries it is 
more or less constant over time.6
We construct a similar ROW volatility series for each host country h, as 
 
, ,(ROW volatility)  = ,   h t l t hl
l
s h lσ ∀ ≠∑ ,   ---(2) 
where ,l tσ  is the growth volatility in home country l in period t. The weight is calculated 
as /hl hl hl
h
s R R= ∑ , where hlR  is the remittance outflow to home country l from host 
country h.  0hms =  if no remittance flows to country m. The hls  matrix is also time 
invariant due to paucity of data.  
 
3 Estimation strategy 
We estimate the following dynamic panel model: 
, , 1 ,i t i t i t i ty yα µ λ δ ε−= + + + + +i,tβX ,  ---(3) 
where ,i ty  is the log of the ratio of remittance inflows (outflows and net flows) to GDP 
for country i in period (interval) t. iµ  represents country fixed effects, the error term ,i tε is 
assumed not be correlated across countries, and tλ denotes time fixed effects which are 
captured by time dummies. The variables in the i,tX vector are the following. 
 
• Growth volatility (log): This is five-year non-overlapping standard deviation of 
growth rate of per capita real GDP de-trended by the HP filter. This variable is 
included to determine the business cycle property of remittance inflows (outflows 
and net flows).  
 
                                                 
6 For example, the main host countries for Bangladesh are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the USA. 
During the 1998-2009 period, the share of remittance inflows from Saudi Arabia ranged between 
0.3 and 0.4. For Kuwait, the share ranged between 0.1 and 0.13, and for the USA, the share 
ranged between 0.14 and 0.17 (Authors’ own calculation using data from Bangladesh Bank).  
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• ROW volatility (log): This variable accounts for volatility in the host/home 
countries. If remittance inflows and net flows are the dependent variables, it is 
, ,(ROW volatility)  = i t j t ij
j
sσ∑  , and if remittance outflows is the dependent 
variable, it is , ,(ROW volatility)  = h t l t hl
l
sσ∑ .  
 
• Inflation volatility (log): This variable has been calculated as a five-year non-
overlapping standard deviation of the CPI inflation rate. Higher inflation can both 
be positively and negatively related to remittance flows depending on the motive 
to remit. For example, higher inflation volatility slows down growth and 
investment thus decreasing remittance flows. Conversely, higher inflation 
volatility increases economic burden on the migrant workers’ family back home 
thus increasing remittances for family support.7
 
   
• Exchange rate volatility (log): This variable has also been calculated as a five-
year non-overlapping standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate with the 
US dollar. The value of remittances in domestic currency depends on the market 
exchange rate, and therefore, remittance flows are likely to depend on exchange 
rate volatility.  
 
• Capital account openness: This variable is constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008). 
The higher the capital account openness, the lower is the barrier to capital flows 
across borders, and therefore, more remittances will flow through official 
channels.  
 
                                                 
7 Inflation rate is nonstationary for many countries. For example, Beyer and Farmer (2007) 
document for the USA, and Koustas and Serletis (2003) document for several European Union 
countries. Inclusion of interest rate instead of inflation volatility makes the regression unbalanced 
since the dependent variable is remittance-GDP ratio, which is regarded as stationary. Exchange 
rate is also nonstationary.  
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• Trade openness: This is the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP. An open 
economy interacts more with the rest of the world that creates greater scope for 
migration of its citizens.  
 
• Investment-GDP ratio: As discussed in Section 2.2, one of the motives for 
remitting is investment. 
 
• Money supply: This is the ratio of M2 to GDP. In macroeconomic research, this 
variable is sometimes used as a proxy for financial development. The ratio of 
private credit to GDP is a better a proxy, but it reduces the number of sample 
countries in our data, therefore we use the ratio of M2 to GDP. Furthermore, M2-
GDP ratio is negatively related to the interest rate. A higher interest rate in the 
home country is expected to increase remittance inflows, while a higher interest 
rate in the host country is expected to decrease remittance outflows.8
 
   
• Institutions: Remittance flows depend on a country’s investment opportunities 
and social welfare systems, which in turn depend on its institutional development. 
Moreover, migrants from a country with oppressive institutions prefer to settle 
permanently in the host country and as a result remit less to the home country. We 
use the “polity2” score as a proxy for institutions. This variable captures the 
regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary 
monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). It examines concomitant qualities of 
democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet 
and mutually exclusive forms of governance.  
 
• Initial real GDP per capita: This variable accounts for the income level of a 
country. The motives for remitting vary across countries of different income 
categories.  
                                                 
8 Interest rate is not comparable across countries because different countries report different 
interest rates.  
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The reason for the dynamic specification is that the remittance-GDP ratio is quite 
persistent. The lagged dependent variable is also intended to account for the effects of 
networks on remittance flows. It is important to mention that remittance flows are 
directly related to the stock of migrants. Migrants remit, along with money, important 
information for the potential migrants; therefore, potential migrants choose to migrate to 
a country where there are already more migrants of their origin. Finding jobs also become 
easier for new migrants in the host country where there are networking opportunities. 
The ROW volatility is treated as exogenous because world economic fluctuations are 
not influenced by a single home or host country. Polity2 is also treated as exogenous as 
we take its initial value for each interval. The investment ratio, volatility of growth, 
inflation, and exchange rates are endogenous as they are also likely to be influenced by 
remittance flows. Money supply is also treated as endogenous because remittance flows 
put pressure on the exchange rate and the central bank has to intervene in the domestic 
money market even if the exchange rate is not entirely fixed.  The Central bank may also 
need to intervene if remittance flows put upward pressure on the inflation rate.  It is not 
clear whether trade and capital account openness are influenced by remittance flows. 
However, it is likely that a host country may not attract migrant workers unless it 
removes constraints on capital outflows. It is also likely that remittance inflows 
pressurize a home country to open up its capital market when migrants want to invest in 
the portfolio market. Historically, workers migrate to countries having close cultural, 
religious or trade links with the home country. We therefore estimate the models treating 
the two openness variables alternatively as exogenous and endogenous. This also helps 
check robustness of the results.  
Our sample period is 1970-2007 because remittance data are available from 1970 and 
data for some explanatory variables are available up to 2007. All volatility measures are 
calculated as five year non-overlapping standard deviations; therefore, other variables are 
five-year averages except initial GDP and polity2 for which initial values of each interval 
are taken. Therefore, we have seven time intervals—1970-74, 75-79, 80-84, 85-89, 90-
94, 95-99 and 2000-07. Remittance (and also other explanatory variables) data are not 
available for many countries for different periods, so we deal with an unbalanced panel 
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data set. The number of countries differs in different specifications depending on the 
choice of both dependent and independent variables. Data sources are discussed in the 
Appendix.  
We estimate equation (3) by the Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond 
(1998) system GMM, which has been designed for datasets with many panels and few 
periods. This method assumes that there is no autocorrelation in the errors and requires 
the initial condition that the panel-level effects be uncorrelated with the first difference of 
the first observation of the dependent variable. We report the Arellano–Bond (1991) test 
statistic for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors. Rejecting the null hypothesis 
at the second order implies that there is no autocorrelation in the errors. The estimators 
are consistent only if the moment conditions are valid. We test whether the 
overidentifying moment conditions are valid by the Sargan statistic. But the asymptotic 
distribution of the Sargan statistic is unknown when the standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. We therefore report the statistic by estimating the model without such 
a correction.  
 
4. Results 
We first provide a brief discussion of the descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the regressions. The results are presented in Table 1.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
The average remittance inflows are about 4% of GDP over the sample period. They are 
higher in low (and lower-medium) income countries (above 5%) than in (upper-medium 
and) rich countries (less than 2%). The average remittance outflows, on the other hand, 
are less than 1.5% of GDP. This result is conceivable given that remittances usually flow 
from high to low income countries. Average growth volatility is higher in low compared 
to high income countries. The ROW volatility for home countries is about 1.4 times 
larger for low compared to high income countries. Conversely, the ROW volatility for 
host countries is about 8 times larger for high than low income countries. In high income 
countries, capital account and trade are more open, inflation and exchange rates are less 
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volatile, the ratio of M2 to GDP is higher and institutional quality is better compared to 
low income countries. 
 
4.1 Determinants of remittance inflows 
Now we turn to the regression results. The results for the determinants of 
remittance inflows for the full sample are presented in Table 2. In column 1, trade and 
capital account openness are treated as exogenous. In columns 2-5, the model is 
estimated treating openness as endogenous. In column 3, only two lags of both dependent 
and independent variables are used as instruments. In all cases, the Sargan statistic shows 
that the instruments are invalid. Column 4 re-estimates column 3 excluding polity2. This 
increases the number of countries as polity2 data are not available for several low income 
countries. The instruments are found to be valid and the AR (2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors is also insignificant suggesting no serial correlation. The 
autoregressive coefficient is 0.73. The result that remittance-GDP ratio is decreasing with 
growth volatility in the home country suggests a pro-cyclical behavior of remittance 
inflows. Remittance inflows decrease by about 6% for a 10% increase in growth 
volatility. On the other hand, the ROW volatility (given by equation (1)) is counter-
cyclical; the remittance-GDP ratio increases by about 4% for a 10% increase in volatility 
in host countries.9
 
 Migrant workers remit more during economic downturns probably 
because of greater uncertainty in host countries. Both trade and capital account openness 
increase remittance inflows. Remittance inflows are also increasing with inflation 
volatility suggesting the altruistic motive of remittance inflows. This is our preferred 
model, so we check the robustness by also estimating the model by the two-step system 
GMM with the Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust standard errors (column 5). We find 
no meaningful change in the results.  
Insert Tables 2-4 here 
                                                 
9 Growth volatility of a country may depend on the ROW volatility. However, in the data 
the correlation between the two volatilities is only 0.14, so we include both in the same 
regression. 
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We also estimate the model separately for low (and lower-medium) and (upper-
medium and) higher income countries. Table 3 presents results for low income countries. 
The number of countries varies between 68 and 73 depending on the choice of 
explanatory variables. Columns 1-4 report the results for different combinations of the 
explanatory variables and instruments (replication of columns 1-4 in Table 2) but in all 
cases the overidentifying restrictions are invalid and the AR (2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors is significant, so we cast doubt on the validity of the results. In 
columns 5 and 6, the model is estimated by the two-step system GMM method; the AR 
(2) coefficient remains significant although the instruments are found to be valid.10
The instruments are valid and there is no serial correlation in the errors when the 
model is estimated for (upper-medium and) high income countries (Table 4). There are 
38 such countries in the sample. We find that growth volatility in the home country does 
not affect the remittance inflows but the ROW volatility is negative and significant 
suggesting that remittance inflows are pro-cyclical to the ROW volatility. The 
remittance-GDP ratio decreases by about 4% when the ROW growth volatility increases 
by 10%. Both trade and capital account openness increase remittance inflows. Inflation 
volatility contributes positively but its effect is not robust. The ROW volatility becomes 
insignificant if the equation is estimated in two steps (column 4). It is also found that the 
coefficient of M2-GDP ratio is negative but not robustly significant in the two-step 
estimation. It is important to mention that the interest rate differential (M2-GDP ratio is a 
proxy for interest rate) between the home and host country is more important for higher 
than lower income countries in determining remittance inflows.  
  
The results that ROW volatility is counter-cyclical when both low and high 
income countries are combined but pro-cyclical in high income countries implies that 
ROW volatility is counter-cyclical in low income countries. We also observe this result in 
Table 3 but cannot confirm because of insufficient validity of the model for low income 
                                                 
10 The results are, to a large extent, similar to those for the full sample with the 
exceptions that growth volatility and capital account openness are not robustly significant 
in one- and two-step estimations. Inflation volatility is insignificant. The ROW volatility 
is pro-cyclical as before and robustly significant. 
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countries. This is also evident in Figure 2 where we observe that average remittance 
inflows to low income countries did not decline during or after the recessions.  
 
4.2 Determinants of remittance outflows 
Now we investigate the determinants of remittance outflows. Note that the sample 
countries do not match the remittance inflow countries because several countries report 
either remittance inflows or outflows.  
The results for the full sample are presented in Table 5. The ROW volatility for 
the host country is now given by equation (2). In columns 1-6, we estimate the model in 
one step. The overidentifying restrictions of the instruments are rejected in all cases—
treating the openness measures both as exogenous and endogenous, combinations of 
explanatory variables and reducing the number of instruments. However, the instruments 
are found to be valid (and no serial correlation of the residual) when the model is 
estimated in two steps and excluding the investment-GDP ratio. The autoregressive 
coefficient ranges between 0.62 and 0.78 (column 7-8). Other than the lagged dependent 
variable, the only two variables found to (positively) affect remittance outflows are the 
ROW volatility and trade openness variables although their significance is not robust. 
The first result implies that remittance outflows from a host country increase when 
volatility in home countries increases suggesting counter-cyclical behavior. For low 
income countries, the instruments are also found to be valid only when the model is 
estimated in two steps (columns 7-8 in Table 6). For this set of countries, none of the 
explanatory variable can explain remittance outflows, even the lagged dependent variable 
is weakly significant.  This is probably because low income countries are net remittance 
recipients.  
 
Insert Tables 5-7 here 
 
However, when the model is estimated for high income countries (Table 7), the 
instruments are valid and there is no serial correlation in the errors. The autoregressive 
coefficient ranges from 0.59 to 0.78 and significant at the 1% level. Trade openness 
significantly increases remittance outflows and is robust to all specifications. Better 
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institutions of the host country are found to reduce remittance outflows.  This result 
deserves attention, although not robust in all specifications. Migrants save money in a 
host country with better institutions probably because they prefer to permanently settle 
there.  
 
4.3 Determinants of net remittance flows 
Finally, we investigate the determinants of net remittance flows.11
The results for the full sample are presented in Table 8. The overidentifying 
restrictions are valid only if two lags of the dependent and independent variables are used 
as instruments (columns 3-4 for the one-step and columns 5-6 for the two-step 
estimation). Trade openness is again found to be positively and robustly significant. The 
important finding is that investment-GDP ratio is negative and significant (although 
robustness does not survive in the two-step estimation). The coefficient is around 0.03 
suggesting that a 10% increase in investment-GDP ratio reduces net remittance flows by 
6.7% (evaluated at the mean value of investment-GDP ratio at 21.78). One possible 
explanation is that the investment-GDP ratio is larger in developed countries which also 
have a higher capital stock and consequently lower marginal product of capital. 
Therefore, a higher investment-GDP ratio attracts lower remittances.  
 The number of 
countries now decreases because, as mentioned earlier, several countries report either 
remittance inflows or outflows. We consider only those countries for which net 
remittance flows are positive.  
 
Insert Tables 8-10 here 
 
The results are also similar when the model is estimated for low income countries 
(Table 9). For high income countries, in addition to trade openness, money supply is 
negative and significant (Table 10) suggesting that higher interest rates (lower money 
supply) attract larger remittance flows to the high income countries.  The net flows are 
                                                 
11 (Remittance inflows — Remittance outflows) / GDP.   
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counter-cyclical but not robust when trade and capital account openness are treated as 
endogenous, and so are capital account openness and investment-GDP ratio.  
The above results indicate that remittance inflows are pro-cyclical to home 
country volatility. On the other hand, for a host country, remittance outflows are counter-
cyclical to the volatility of home countries. Both results are consistent with the 
investment motive in that when volatility in the home country increases, migrants will 
remit less money back home. Trade openness is the single most important factor that 
increases both remittance inflows and outflows for the home and host countries, 
respectively.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates the macroeconomic determinants of remittance inflows 
vis-à-vis the role of business cycle fluctuations in host countries. These two important 
issues have been ignored in the previous literature. The key innovation of the paper is to 
incorporate business cycle information of all host countries by constructing a rest-of-the-
world volatility index for each home country. A separate model for remittance outflows 
has been estimated to understand the macroeconomic factors of host countries 
responsible for remittance inflows to home countries. The model is estimated by the 
dynamic panel system GMM method. The results show that remittance inflows are pro-
cyclical to home country volatility but counter-cyclical to the volatility in host countries. 
The above results also hold for low income countries. This result is consistent with the 
investment motive. But for high income counties, remittance inflows are acyclical to 
home country volatility but pro-cyclical to the volatility in host countries.  Trade and 
capital account openness increase remittance inflows for both low and high income 
countries. On the other hand, for a host country, remittance outflows are counter-cyclical 
to the volatility of home countries. This once again is consistent with the investment 
motive in that when volatility in the home country increases, migrants will remit less 
money back home. Trade openness increases while better institutions decrease remittance 
outflows in high income countries. The latter result indicates that migrants remit less if 
the host country has better institutions probably because they want to permanently settle 
there. Finally, the model is estimated for net remittance flows, the results show that 
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higher interest rates (lower money supply) increases net remittance flows in high income 
countries. Trade openness has been found to positively impact on both remittance inflows 
and outflows and for both low and high income countries. Lastly, both net remittance 
flows and outflows are acyclical to host country volatility. 
The results suggest that remittance flows depends on both home and host country 
characteristics, and that the macroeconomic determinants cannot be generalized for low 
and high income countries. 
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    Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variables  Country income category 
 All  Low and lower 
medium income 
Upper medium and 
high income 
Remittance inflow/GDP 0.036 (0.079) 0.051 (0.100) 0.018 (0.033) 
Remittance outflow/GDP 0.014 (0.024) 0.014 (0.023) 0.013 (0.025) 
Remittance net flow/GDP 0.022 (0.098) 0.037 (0.133) 0.005 (0.027) 
Volatility of GDP growth  4.268 (4.317) 4.743 (4.329) 3.762 (4.260) 
Volatility of the ROW GDP 
growth-1* 
1.891 (1.360) 2.147 (1.634) 1.575 (0.822) 
Volatility of the ROW GDP 
growth-2** 
2.572 (10.167) 0.579 (1.525) 4.616 (14.366) 
Capital account openness -0.053 (1.453) -0.558 (1.137) 0.519 (1.550) 
Trade openness 78.206 (45.446) 66.747 (36.142) 91.470 (51.123) 
Inflation volatility  52.893 (486.185) 84.394 (687.971) 23.338 (108.646) 
Exchange rate volatility  49.087 (271.222) 87.375 (373.807) 9.775 (50.061) 
Money supply (M2)/GDP  50.745 (297.270) 48.647 (392.765) 53.521 (36.323) 
Polity2 score -0.500 (7.434) -3.044 (5.978) 2.873 (7.829) 
Investment-GDP ratio 21.780 (13.008) 18.452 (13.803) 25.542 (10.952) 
Number of countries 117 68 49 
 
Figures in the parentheses are standard deviations.  * Calculated by the formula in equation (1) in the text. 
** Calculated by the formula in equation (2) in the text. 
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Table 2: Determinants of remittance inflows:  Log of remittance inflow/GDP is the 
dependent variable (system GMM estimation of equation 3) 
Explanatory       
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag of the dependent variable  0.640*** 
(7.57) 
0.623*** 
(8.08) 
0.666*** 
(7.56) 
0.726*** 
(8.45) 
0.763*** 
(8.73) 
Growth volatility (log)  -0.490*** 
(-3.66) 
-0.392*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.503*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.609*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.591*** 
(-3.22) 
ROW growth volatility (log)  0.294* 
(1.80) 
0.257* 
(1.65) 
0.301* 
(1.83) 
0.360** 
(2.04) 
0.406* 
(1.88) 
Capital account openness 0.144* 
(1.95) 
0.195*** 
(3.01) 
0.189** 
(2.21) 
0.174* 
(1.95) 
0.153 
(1.61) 
Trade openness 0.011*** 
(2.64) 
0.010*** 
(3.26) 
0.009** 
(2.59) 
0.007** 
(2.02) 
0.006* 
(1.66) 
Inflation volatility (log)  0.154* 
(1.85) 
0.147** 
(1.96) 
0.203* 
(1.90) 
0.226** 
(2.20) 
0.225** 
(2.41) 
Exchange rate volatility (log)  -0.055 (-
1.13) 
-0.061 (-
1.36) 
-0.059 (-
0.93) 
-0.041 (-
0.62) 
-0.043 (-
0.58) 
Money supply  -0.0004 (-
0.09) 
-0.001 (-
0.15) 
-0.001 (-
0.34) 
-0.004 (-
1.16) 
-0.003 (-
0.82) 
Initial Polity2  -0.014 (-
1.13) 
-0.011 (-
0.92) 
-0.011 (-
0.88) 
  
Initial GDP (log) -0.550** (-
2.50) 
-0.566*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.518** (-
2.47) 
-0.351* (-
1.67) 
-0.309 (-
1.46) 
Investment-GDP ratio -0.016 (-
1.10) 
-0.013 (-
0.97) 
-0.010 (-
0.77) 
-0.008 (-
0.62) 
-0.008 (-
0.59) 
AR(2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors (p-value) 
0.124 0.082 0.124 0.166 0.124 
Sargan statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) 
0.028 0.012 0.023 0.258 0.390 
Number of instruments 131 169 93 92 92 
Number of countries 106 106 106 116 116 
Total number of observations 353 353 353 383 383 
 
Figures in the parentheses are Arellano-Bond robust t-statistics. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. All equations contain a constant and time dummies but they are not reported.   
Column 1: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, trade openness, capital account openness, 
and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 2-4: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 3-4: Only two lags are used as instruments.  
Column 5: Replicates column 4 by two-step estimation with Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust t-
statistics.  
ROW growth volatility is calculated by the formula in equation (1).  
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 Table 3: Determinants of remittance inflows for low- and lower-medium income 
countries:  Log of remittance inflow/GDP is the dependent variable (system GMM 
estimation of equation 3)  
Explanatory        
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lag of the dependent variable  0.610*** 
(8.66) 
0.615*** 
(9.99) 
0.660*** 
(8.97) 
0.650*** 
(9.22) 
0.652*** 
(5.94) 
0.649*** 
(7.42) 
Growth volatility (log)  -0.476*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.346*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.384** 
(-2.40) 
-0.459*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.460 (-
0.90) 
-0.501 (-
2.11) 
ROW growth volatility (log)  0.315* 
(1.76) 
0.336** 
(2.00) 
0.334** 
(1.98) 
0.346* 
(1.90) 
0.358* 
(1.73) 
0.347* 
(1.86) 
Capital account openness 0.209** 
(2.07) 
0.143* 
(1.87) 
0.135 
(1.61) 
0.115 
(1.27) 
0.244** 
(2.16) 
0.150 
(1.59) 
Trade openness 0.011** 
(2.35) 
0.009** 
(2.47) 
0.010** 
(2.51) 
0.010** 
(2.39) 
0.008 
(1.63) 
0.009** 
(2.59) 
Inflation volatility (log)  0.107 
(1.41) 
0.086 
(1.28) 
0.137 
(1.36) 
0.133 
(1.35) 
0.097 
(0.63) 
0.155 
(1.34) 
Exchange rate volatility (log)  0.032 
(0.58) 
0.039 
(0.72) 
0.076 
(1.09) 
0.068 
(0.96) 
0.009 
(0.12) 
0.046 
(0.41) 
Money supply  0.007 
(0.93) 
0.008 
(1.21) 
0.007 
(1.12) 
0.006 
(1.00) 
0.005 
(0.59) 
0.006 
(0.87) 
Initial Polity2  -0.008 (-
0.57) 
0.006 
(0.43) 
0.011 
(0.71) 
 -0.010 (-
0.42) 
 
Initial GDP (log) -0.046 (-
0.20) 
0.032 
(0.17) 
0.164 
(0.82) 
0.134 
(0.66) 
-0.028 (-
0.08) 
0.035 
(0.13) 
Investment-GDP ratio -0.017 (-
1.21) 
-0.011 (-
0.96) 
-0.011 (-
0.89) 
-0.011 (-
0.95) 
-0.016 (-
0.80) 
-0.011 (-
0.77) 
AR(2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors (p-value) 
0.031 0.024 0.022 0.030 0.081 0.043 
Sargan statistic of 
overidentifying restrictions (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.922 
Number of instruments 131 169 93 92 131 92 
Number of countries 68 68 68 73 68 73 
Total number of observations 234 234 234 246 234 246 
 
Figures in the parentheses are Arellano-Bond robust t-statistics. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. All equations contain a constant and time dummies but they are not reported.   
Column 1: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, trade openness, capital account openness, 
and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 2-4: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 3-4: Only two lags are used as instruments.  
 Columns 5 and 6: Replicate columns 1 and 4, respectively, by two-step estimation with Windmeijer (2005) 
corrected robust t-statistics. 
ROW growth volatility is calculated by the formula in equation (1). 
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Table 4: Determinants of remittance inflows for upper-medium and high income 
countries:  Log of remittance inflow/GDP is the dependent variable (system GMM 
estimation of equation 3)  
Explanatory      
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag of the dependent variable  0.551*** 
(7.20) 
0.549*** 
(7.44) 
0.606*** 
(8.50) 
0.641*** 
(6.58) 
Growth volatility (log)  -0.138 (-
1.10) 
-0.151 (-
1.15) 
-0.130 (-
0.76) 
-0.003 (-
0.02) 
ROW growth volatility (log)  -0.356* (-
1.89) 
-0.344* (-
1.76) 
-0.355* (-
1.71) 
-0.276 (-
1.23) 
Capital account openness 0.096 
(1.31) 
0.142** 
(2.26) 
0.207*** 
(2.76) 
0.204* 
(1.65) 
Trade openness 0.011*** 
(3.11) 
0.011*** 
(5.06) 
0.011*** 
(4.02) 
0.011** 
(2.38) 
Inflation volatility (log)  0.140* 
(1.84) 
0.119 
(1.43) 
0.178** 
(2.01) 
0.144 
(1.10) 
Exchange rate volatility (log)  -0.095 (-
1.25) 
-0.081 (-
1.15) 
-0.062 (-
0.95) 
-0.102* 
(-1.92) 
Money supply  -0.005 (-
1.46) 
-0.006* (-
1.78) 
-0.005 (-
1.40) 
-0.006 (-
0.96) 
Initial Polity2  0.021 
(0.93) 
0.026 
(1.11) 
0.029 
(1.15) 
0.048 
(1.27) 
Initial GDP (log) -0.865*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.803*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.800*** 
(-2.38) 
-0.793 (-
1.24) 
Investment-GDP ratio 0.010 
(0.55) 
0.007 
(0.51) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
-0.015 (-
0.63) 
AR(2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors (p-value) 
0.586 0.570 0.591 0.922 
Sargan statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) 
0.849 0.840 0.742 1.00 
Number of instruments 109 119 90 90 
Number of countries 38 38 38 38 
Total number of observations 119 119 119 119 
 
Figures in the parentheses are Arellano-Bond robust t-statistics. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. All equations contain a constant and time dummies but they are not reported.  
Column 1: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, trade openness, capital account openness, 
and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 2-3: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, and initial income are endogenous.  
Column 3: Only two lags are used as instruments.  
Column 4: Replicates column 3 by two-step estimation with Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust t-
statistics.  
ROW growth volatility is calculated by the formula in equation (1). 
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Table 5: Determinants of remittance outflows:  Log of remittance outflow/GDP is the 
dependent variable (system GMM estimation of equation 3) 
Explanatory        
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lag of the dependent variable  0.636*** 
(6.39) 
0.691*** 
(7.58) 
0.799*** 
(7.97) 
0.845*** 
(9.95) 
0.628*** 
(5.17) 
0.758*** 
(5.95) 
Growth volatility (log)  0.122 
(0.98) 
0.030 
(0.26) 
0.061 
(0.39) 
0.042 
(0.29) 
0.032 
(0.24) 
-0.013 (-
0.07) 
ROW growth volatility (log)  0.155 
(1.19) 
0.058 
(0.56) 
0.063 
(0.63) 
-0.026 (-
0.33) 
0.366** 
(2.00) 
0.223* 
(1.65) 
Capital account openness 0.153** 
(2.11) 
0.073 
(1.30) 
0.012 
(0.15) 
0.009 
(0.12) 
0.132* 
(1.70) 
0.006 
(0.07) 
Trade openness 0.009*** 
(3.17) 
0.006** 
(2.41) 
0.005* 
(1.81) 
0.003 
(1.12) 
0.006* 
(1.82) 
0.007*** 
(2.88) 
Inflation volatility (log)  0.043 
(0.80) 
0.069 
(1.19) 
-0.033 (-
0.50) 
-0.028 (-
0.42) 
0.057 
(0.91) 
-0.029 (-
0.38) 
Exchange rate volatility (log)  0.045 
(0.78) 
0.048 
(1.08) 
-0.007 (-
0.13) 
-0.034 (-
0.73) 
-0.025 (-
0.41) 
-0.063 (-
1.10) 
Money supply  0.005 
(1.26) 
0.006 
(1.62) 
0.004 
(1.17) 
0.002 
(0.93) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.001 (-
0.33) 
Initial Polity2  0.008 
(0.48) 
-0.002 (-
0.10) 
0.010 
(0.56) 
 -0.003 (-
0.18) 
-0.001 (-
0.04) 
Initial GDP (log) -0.161 (-
0.57) 
-0.040 (-
0.17) 
-0.068 (-
0.32) 
-0.082 (-
0.47) 
-0.283 (-
1.01) 
-0.175 (-
0.89) 
Investment-GDP ratio -0.023 (-
1.28) 
-0.017 (-
1.17) 
-0.015 (-
1.01) 
-0.011 (-
0.90) 
  
AR(2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors (p-value) 
0.202 0.219 0.210 0.290 0.303 0.369 
Sargan statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) 
0.001 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.002 
Number of instruments 131 169 93 92 111 83 
Number of countries 92 92 92 100 92 92 
Total number of observations 291 291 291 316 291 291 
 
Table 5 continues in next page.  
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Table 5 (continued): Determinants of remittance outflows:  Log of remittance 
outflow/GDP is the dependent variable (system GMM estimation of equation 3) 
Explanatory      
variables (7) (8)   
Lag of the dependent variable  0.6241*** 
(3.37) 
0.776*** 
(4.30) 
  
Growth volatility (log)  0.058 
(0.13) 
-0.033 (-
0.09) 
  
ROW growth volatility (log)  0.358* 
(1.67) 
0.197 (1.26)   
Capital account openness 0.137 
(1.24) 
0.026 (0.26)      
Trade openness 0.005 
(1.24) 
0.007** 
(2.44) 
  
Inflation volatility (log)  0.053 
(0.80) 
-0.007 (-
0.05) 
  
Exchange rate volatility (log)  -0.006 (-
0.07) 
-0.047 (-
0.77) 
  
Money supply  -0.000 (-
0.01) 
-0.001 (-
0.17) 
  
Initial Polity2  -0.002 (-
0.06) 
-0.001 (-
0.06) 
  
Initial GDP (log) -0.242 (-
0.84) 
-0.185 (-
0.69) 
  
AR(2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors (p-value) 
0.309 0.442   
Sargan statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) 
0.977 0.374   
Number of instruments 111 83   
Number of countries 92 92   
Total number of observations 291 291   
 
Figures in the parentheses are Arellano-Bond robust t-statistics. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. All equations contain a constant and time dummies but they are not reported.  
Column 1: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, trade openness, capital account openness, 
and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 2-4: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 3-4: Only two lags are used as instruments.  
Columns 5 and 6 replicate columns 1 and 3, respectively, but exclude investment-output ratio. 
Columns 7 and 8: Replicate columns 5 and 6, respectively, by two-step estimation with Windmeijer (2005) 
corrected robust t-statistics. 
ROW growth volatility is calculated by the formula in equation (2). 
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 Table 6: Determinants of remittance outflows for low- and lower medium income 
countries:  Log of remittance outflow/GDP is the dependent variable (system GMM 
estimation of equation 3)  
Explanatory        
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lag of the dependent variable  0.537*** 
(3.78) 
0.640*** 
(5.08) 
0.668** 
(5.23) 
0.712*** 
(6.23) 
0.529*** 
(3.12) 
0.626*** 
(4.05) 
Growth volatility (log)  -0.136 (-
0.98) 
-0.166 (-
1.27) 
-0.269 (-
0.99) 
-0.344 (-
1.29) 
-0.184 (-
1.02) 
-0.339 (-
1.14) 
ROW growth volatility (log)  0.187 
(1.62) 
0.077 
(0.80) 
0.046 
(0.47) 
-0.049 (-
0.62) 
0.311* 
(1.84) 
0.247 
(1.38) 
Capital account openness 0.360*** 
(2.79) 
0.241** 
(2.58) 
0.289*** 
(2.91) 
0.294*** 
(2.85) 
0.314** 
(2.30) 
0.245* 
(1.86) 
Trade openness 0.010** 
(2.13) 
0.009** 
(2.11) 
0.012** 
(2.54) 
0.011*** 
(2.72) 
0.010* 
(1.87) 
0.012** 
(2.54) 
Inflation volatility (log)  0.069 
(0.82) 
0.042 
(0.56) 
0.005 
(0.07) 
-0.001 (-
0.01) 
0.058 
(0.72) 
-0.011 (-
0.13) 
Exchange rate volatility (log)  0.043 
(0.47) 
0.040 
(0.44) 
0.048 
(0.50) 
0.063 
(0.76) 
0.057 
(0.60) 
0.062 
(0.57) 
Money supply  0.016 
(1.35) 
0.013 
(1.40) 
0.010 
(1.03) 
0.013* 
(1.75) 
0.007 
(0.58) 
-0.005 (-
0.38) 
Initial Polity2  0.006 
(0.33) 
0.008 
(0.49) 
0.016 
(0.86) 
 0.002 
(0.14) 
0.009 
(0.50) 
Initial GDP (log) -0.614 (-
1.64) 
-0.346 (-
1.02) 
-0.368 (-
1.08) 
-0.299 (-
0.95) 
-0.368 (-
1.05) 
-0.122 (-
0.38) 
Investment-GDP ratio -0.020 (-
0.97) 
-0.025 (-
1.34) 
-0.038* 
(-1.84) 
-0.049** 
(-2.30) 
  
AR(2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors (p-value) 
0.753 0.589 0.873 0.905 0.644 0.814 
Sargan statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) 
0.007 0.097 0.068 0.080 0.003 0.014 
Number of instruments 130 151 91 90 111 82 
Number of countries 53 53 53 57 53 53 
Total number of observations 164 164 164 175 164 164 
 
  
Table 6 continues in next page.  
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Table 6 (continued): Determinants of remittance outflows for low- and lower medium 
income countries:  Log of remittance outflow/GDP is the dependent variable (system 
GMM estimation of equation 3) 
Explanatory      
variables (7) (8)   
Lag of the dependent variable  0.550 (1.15) 0.691* (1.87)   
Growth volatility (log)  -0.301 (-0.94) -0.323 (-0.34)   
ROW growth volatility (log)  0.247 (1.30) 0.183 (0.34)   
Capital account openness 0.388 (0.66) 0.163 (0.33)   
Trade openness 0.010 (1.15) 0.010 (0.89)   
Inflation volatility (log)  0.016 (0.08) -0.022 (-0.07)   
Exchange rate volatility (log)  0.052 (0.18) 0.065 (0.47)   
Money supply  -0.004 (-0.14) -0.000 (-0.02)   
Initial Polity2  -0.003 (-0.07) 0.006 (0.23)   
Initial GDP (log) -0.362 (-0.32) -0.170 (-0.28)   
AR(2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors (p-value) 
0.964 0.671   
Sargan statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) 
1.000 0.998   
Number of instruments 111 82   
Number of countries 53 53   
Total number of observations 164 164   
 
Figures in the parentheses are Arellano-Bond robust t-statistics. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. All equations contain a constant and time dummies but they are not reported.   
Column 1: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, trade openness, capital account openness, 
and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 2-4: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 3-4: Only two lags are used as instruments.   
Columns 5 and 6 replicate columns 1 and 3, respectively, but exclude investment-output ratio.  
Columns 7 and 8: Replicate columns 5 and 6, respectively, by two-step estimation with Windmeijer (2005) 
corrected robust t-statistics. 
ROW growth volatility is calculated by the formula in equation (2). 
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Table 7: Determinants of remittance outflows for upper-medium and high income 
countries:  Log of remittance outflow/GDP is the dependent variable (system GMM 
estimation of equation 3)  
Explanatory       
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag of the dependent variable  0.645*** 
(9.81) 
0.693*** 
(10.08) 
0.770*** 
(9.63) 
0.588*** 
(9.71) 
0.697*** 
(8.72) 
Growth volatility (log)  0.130 
(0.90) 
0.148 
(0.93) 
0.223 
(1.39) 
0.081 
(0.54) 
0.163 
(0.90) 
ROW growth volatility (log)  0.083 
(0.92) 
0.068 
(1.13) 
0.085 
(1.60) 
0.073 
(0.66) 
0.074 
(0.90) 
Capital account openness 0.046 
(0.54) 
0.076 
(0.81) 
0.097 
(0.93) 
0.035 
(0.37) 
0.074 
(0.72) 
Trade openness 0.010*** 
(3.52) 
0.006*** 
(3.09) 
0.005** 
(2.34) 
0.009*** 
(2.82) 
0.005** 
(2.09) 
Inflation volatility (log)  0.089 
(1.32) 
0.127 
(1.63) 
0.059 
(0.71) 
0.167*** 
(2.66) 
0.097 
(1.40) 
Exchange rate volatility (log)  -0.043 (-
0.71) 
-0.003 (-
0.06) 
0.016 
(0.30) 
-0.082 (-
1.05) 
-0.024 (-
0.36) 
Money supply  0.003 
(1.15) 
0.003 
(0.98) 
0.002 
(0.74) 
0.002 
(0.95) 
0.002 
(0.77) 
Initial Polity2  -0.031* (-
1.94) 
-0.028 (-
1.97) 
-0.015 (-
1.03) 
-0.041** 
(-2.34) 
-0.021 (-
1.32) 
Initial GDP (log) 0.017 
(0.08) 
0.118 
(0.62) 
0.020 
(0.08) 
0.216 
(1.08) 
0.169 
(0.68) 
Investment-GDP ratio 0.001 
(0.04) 
0.008 
(0.54) 
0.008 
(0.56) 
  
AR(2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors (p-value) 
0.999 0.922 0.735 0.848 0.886 
Sargan statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) 
0.399 0.489 0.774 0.494 0.680 
Number of instruments 115 125 91 107 82 
Number of countries 39 39 39 39 39 
Total number of observations 127 127 127 127 127 
 
Figures in the parentheses are Arellano-Bond robust t-statistics. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. All equations contain a constant and time dummies but they are not reported.  
Column 1: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, trade openness, capital account openness, 
and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 2-3: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, and initial income are endogenous.  
Column 3: Only two lags are used as instruments. 
Columns 4 and 6 replicate columns 1 and 3, respectively, but exclude investment-output ratio. 
ROW growth volatility is calculated by the formula in equation (2). 
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Table 8: Determinants of net remittance flows:  Log of net remittance flow/GDP is the 
dependent variable (system GMM estimation of equation 3)  
Explanatory        
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lag of the dependent variable  0.557*** 
(5.30) 
0.550*** 
(5.70) 
0.597*** 
(5.31) 
0.602*** 
(5.77) 
0.621*** 
(2.83) 
0.609*** 
(3.47) 
Growth volatility (log)  0.046 
(0.30) 
0.056 
(0.38) 
-0.086 (-
0.38) 
0.007 
(0.03) 
-0.050 (-
0.04) 
-0.055 (-
0.05) 
ROW growth volatility (log)  0.039 
(0.12) 
0.054 
(0.18) 
0.037 
(0.12) 
-0.018 (-
0.07) 
0.070 
(0.21) 
-0.051 (-
0.16) 
Capital account openness 0.202 
(1.58) 
0.160 
(1.49) 
0.099 
(0.94) 
0.104 
(0.96) 
0.106 
(0.63) 
0.143 
(0.55) 
Trade openness 0.010* 
(1.85) 
0.011** 
(2.41) 
0.009** 
(2.13) 
0.007* 
(1.90) 
0.008* 
(1.68) 
0.008 
(1.10) 
Inflation volatility (log)  0.056 
(0.50) 
0.019 
(0.19) 
0.031 
(0.29) 
-0.034 (-
0.35) 
0.067 
(0.26) 
0.007 
(0.03) 
Exchange rate volatility (log)  -0.032 (-
0.47) 
-0.050 (-
0.79) 
-0.034 (-
0.48) 
-0.042 (-
0.59) 
-0.056 (-
0.24) 
-0.047 (-
0.17) 
Money supply  -0.004 (-
0.60) 
-0.006 (-
0.87) 
-0.003 (-
0.51) 
-0.007 (-
1.07) 
-0.005 (-
0.70) 
-0.008 (-
0.70) 
Initial Polity2  -0.036* 
(-1.67) 
-0.029 (-
1.41) 
-0.025 (-
1.16) 
 -0.031 (-
0.66) 
 
Initial GDP (log) -0.416 (-
1.37) 
-0.373 (-
1.51) 
-0.383 (-
1.57) 
-0.489** 
(-2.25) 
-0.312 (-
0.51) 
-0.474* 
(-1.98) 
Investment-GDP ratio -0.035* 
(-1.94) 
-0.035** 
(-1.99) 
-0.033** 
(-2.10) 
-0.030** 
(-2.05) 
-0.029 (-
1.29) 
-0.028 (-
1.26) 
AR(2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors (p-value) 
0.414 0.428 0.680 0.937 0.776 0.999 
Sargan statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) 
0.089 0.040 0.212 0.120 0.993 0.977 
Number of instruments 127 144 91 91 91 91 
Number of countries 67 67 67 72 67 67 
Total number of observations 173 173 173 189 173 173 
 
Figures in the parentheses are Arellano-Bond robust t-statistics. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. All equations contain a constant and time dummies but they are not reported.  
Column 1: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, trade openness, capital account openness, 
and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 2-4: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 3-4: Only two lags are used as instruments.  
Columns 5 and 6: Replicate columns 3 and 4, respectively, by two-step estimation with Windmeijer (2005) 
corrected robust t-statistics. 
ROW growth volatility is calculated by the formula in equation (1). 
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 Table 9: Determinants of net remittance flows for low- and lower medium income 
countries:  Log of net remittance flow/GDP is the dependent variable (system GMM 
estimation of equation 3)  
Explanatory       
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag of the dependent variable  0.512*** 
(5.99) 
0.509*** 
(6.91) 
0.479*** 
(5.78) 
0.490*** 
(5.76) 
0.469 
(1.54) 
Growth volatility (log)  0.192 
(1.25) 
0.186 
(1.18) 
0.123 
(0.61) 
0.036 
(0.19) 
-0.056 (-
0.08) 
ROW growth volatility (log)  0.275 
(1.05) 
0.298 
(1.28) 
0.279 
(1.27) 
0.282 
(1.25) 
0.226 
(0.49) 
Capital account openness 0.298* 
(1.82) 
0.157 
(1.52) 
0.137 
(1.22) 
0.094 
(0.93) 
0.157 
(0.76) 
Trade openness 0.013** 
(2.58) 
0.010*** 
(2.95) 
0.012*** 
(3.46) 
0.011** 
(2.62) 
0.011 
(1.56) 
Inflation volatility (log)  -0.041 (-
0.39) 
-0.047 (-
0.45) 
-0.091 (-
0.86) 
-0.090 (-
0.95) 
-0.050 (-
0.21) 
Exchange rate volatility (log)  0.012 
(0.18) 
0.008 
(0.14) 
0.019 
(0.35) 
-0.035 (-
0.61) 
-0.051 (-
0.29) 
Money supply  0.011 
(1.08) 
0.007 
(0.90) 
0.010 
(1.12) 
0.006 
(0.92) 
0.008 
(0.51) 
Initial Polity2  -0.008 (-
0.33) 
0.007 
(0.26) 
0.015 
(0.50) 
  
Initial GDP (log) 0.098 
(0.41) 
0.164 
(0.95) 
0.116 
(0.59) 
0.125 
(0.62) 
0.065 
(0.17) 
Investment-GDP ratio -0.052** 
(-2.01) 
-0.04* (-
1.88) 
-0.044** 
(-2.29) 
-0.042** 
(-2.35) 
-0.044*** 
(-3.01) 
AR(2) coefficient of the first-
differenced errors (p-value) 
0.647 0.617 0.605 0.861 0.935 
Sargan statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) 
0.077 0.104 0.140 0.069 0.999 
Number of instruments 103 113 86 85 85 
Number of countries 45 45 45 48 48 
Total number of observations 120 120 120 127 127 
 
Figures in the parentheses are Arellano-Bond robust t-statistics. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. All equations contain a constant and time dummies but they are not reported. 
Column 1: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, trade openness, capital account openness, 
and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 2-4: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, and initial income are endogenous.  
Columns 3-4: Only two lags are used as instruments.  
 Column 5: Replicates column 4 by two-step estimation with Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust t-
statistics.  
ROW growth volatility is calculated by the formula in equation (1). 
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Table 10: Determinants of net remittance flows for upper-medium and high income 
countries:  Log of net remittance flow/GDP is the dependent variable (system GMM 
estimation of equation 3)  
Explanatory    
variables (1) (2) 
Lag of the dependent variable  0.547*** (3.30) 0.610*** (4.69) 
Growth volatility (log)  -0.143 (-0.71) -0.219 (-1.01) 
ROW growth volatility (log)  -0.320 (-0.86) -0.496* (-1.69) 
Capital account openness 0.354** (2.56) 0.132 (1.04) 
Trade openness 0.016*** (2.63) 0.008** (2.04) 
Inflation volatility (log)  0.055 (0.30) -0.011 (-0.07) 
Exchange rate volatility (log)  -0.019 (-0.14) -0.054 (-0.58) 
Money supply  -0.023*** (-3.80) -0.015** (-2.21) 
Initial Polity2  -0.019 (-0.29) -0.017 (-0.39) 
Initial GDP (log) -0.195 (-0.34) -0.703 (-1.63) 
Investment-GDP ratio -0.077** (-2.00) -0.032 (-1.20) 
AR(2) coefficient of the first-differenced 
errors (p-value) 
0.562 0.710 
Sargan statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) 
0.892 0.964 
Number of instruments 62 71 
Number of countries 22 22 
Total number of observations 53 53 
 
Figures in the parentheses are Arellano-Bond robust t-statistics. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. All equations contain a constant and time dummies but they are not reported.  
Column 1: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, trade openness, capital account openness, 
and initial income are endogenous.  
Column 2: All variables except ROW growth volatility, polity2, and initial income are endogenous. Only 
two lags are used as instruments. 
ROW growth volatility is calculated by the formula in equation (1). 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Average remittance inflows (1970=100) 
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Figure 2: Average remittance inflows to low and lower-medium income countries 
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Figure 3: Average remittance inflows to high-income countries (1970=100) 
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Figure 4: Average remittance inflows to upper-medium and high-income countries 
(1970=100) 
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Appendix: 
 
Variables Data source 
Remittance flows  World Bank 
Real GDP Penn World Table 6.2 
Investment-GDP ratio Penn World Table 6.2 
Openness (X + M as a % GDP) World Bank 
Nominal exchange rate World Bank 
M2-GDP ratio World Bank 
CPI inflation World Bank 
Capital account openness Chinn and Ito (2008) 
Polity2 Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007 
 
 
 
